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NO. 6 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction 
US-Russia Policy Hits European Energy 
Supply 
The Consequences of Unilateral Sanctions and Growing Market Competition 
Sascha Lohmann and Kirsten Westphal 
Triggered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Ukraine in 
early 2014, the governments of the United States (US) and the Russian Federation have 
since been locked in a geopolitical confrontation, which is largely playing out on the 
economic stage. In addition to unilateral economic sanctions, the US government is 
focussing on the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In doing so, it wants to reduce 
not only Russian state revenues, but also European dependence on Russian energy im-
ports. In this context, the US policy is aimed squarely at the German federal govern-
ment, which was described by President Donald J. Trump as a “prisoner of Russia”. 
The more the European-Russian energy trade is drawn into the conflict between 
Washington and Moscow, the more serious the consequences are likely to be for 
European energy supply. 
 
The increased use of economic instruments 
of power in US policy towards Russia is 
negatively affecting European and German 
interests. The current discussion on the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is currently 
under construction, has lost sight of the 
fact that this sanctions policy has a con-
siderable impact on energy relations be-
tween Europe and Russia. This project has 
not only been criticised in the European 
Union and Germany, but in Washington 
too. The US government is exploring ways 
and means to stop this project from being 
completed. 
Back in the 1960s and 1980s, US admin-
istrations were trying to prevent the con-
struction of Russian pipelines running 
through Ukraine today with a mix of in-
centives and pressure on their European 
allies. Since 2015, the Nord Stream 2 pro-
ject, with its high political costs (see SWP 
Research Paper 3/2017), has presented the 
German government with the dilemma of 
how to reconcile legal principles, economic 
interests as well as foreign and European 
policy paradigms. At the same time, US 
sanctions severely restrict the ability of 
Germany and Europe to take autonomous 
action. This not only threatens EU cohesion 
on energy policy but also energy security in 
terms of providing a competitive, stable and 
flexible supply on demand. 
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Unilateral Sanctions as a Tool of 
US Russia Policy 
Even during the Cold War, the US govern-
ment relied primarily on unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions to weaken the Soviet 
leadership in this conflict of systems. This 
sanctions policy started out as a strict uni-
lateral export control regime for dual-use 
and military goods which, in coordination 
with the Western allies, eventually became 
a multilateral embargo. Washington also 
denied the Soviet Union and its successor, 
the Russian Federation, Most Favoured 
Nation status in bilateral trade relations 
between 1951 and 1992. Once the Cold War 
was over, the US government imposed 
unilateral sanctions on the now Russian 
defence firms for their exports to Iran, 
thereby excluding them selectively and 
temporarily from the US market. Since the 
end of 2012, the US government has re-
fused to issue visas to Russian officials 
accused of human rights abuses and cor-
ruption and has frozen their assets where 
they are under US jurisdiction. 
The US government imposed far more 
extensive sanctions in March 2014 in re-
sponse to the incorporation of the Black Sea 
peninsula of Crimea into the Russian Fed-
eration in contravention of international 
law, as well as to Moscow’s destabilisation 
policy in eastern Ukraine. Initially, the 
US Departments of Commerce and State 
tightened export controls on dual-use and 
military goods, technology and services. At 
the same time, the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) within the US Department 
of the Treasury began listing Russian indi-
viduals and entities belonging to President 
Vladimir Putin’s inner circle as Specially 
Designated Nationals (SDNs) and Blocked 
Persons. This measure allows any assets 
they own under US jurisdiction to be fro-
zen. In addition, US persons are prohibited 
from entering into business relationships 
with those listed as SDNs. The prohibition 
is enforced under civil and criminal law 
and extends to entities that are more than 
50 percent owned or controlled by listed 
Russian individuals or entities. 
The reasons for being listed as an SDN 
are set out in four Executive Orders (E.O.) 
issued by President Obama between March 
and December 2014, and codified into law 
by Congress in August 2017. These include 
“asserting government authority over the 
Crimean region without the authorisation 
of the Ukrainian government, undermining 
democratic processes or institutions in 
Ukraine and threatening the peace, secu-
rity, stability, sovereignty or territorial in-
tegrity of Ukraine; and also misappropriat-
ing the state assets of Ukraine or of an eco-
nomically significant entity in Ukraine” 
(E.O. 13,660). High-ranking members of the 
Russian government and their supporters 
(particularly the so-called oligarchs), but 
also persons active in the Russian defence 
sector (E.O. 13,661; 13,662) or trading and 
investing in Crimea (E.O. 13,685) can also 
be listed as SDNs. 
The more than 30 unilateral US sanctions 
regimes that address, inter alia, the prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-
national crime and a series of state and 
non-state actors have repeatedly targeted 
Russian individuals, organisations and in-
stitutions. Current listings were based on 
Russian activities in relation to certain 
states such as Syria, Iran and North Korea, 
as well as in connection with alleged cyber 
attacks and meddling in the 2016 US presi-
dential election campaign. Once the US 
Department of State had determined that 
the Kremlin was involved in the poisoning 
of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei 
Skripal in the UK, Washington imposed 
further trade sanctions on Russia, the first 
wave of which came into force in August 
2018. 
Consideration for European 
interests under Obama 
President Barack H. Obama proceeded cau-
tiously in imposing unilateral US sanctions 
against one of the world’s largest energy 
exporters. Giving consideration to European 
allies’ considerable energy imports from 
Russia, his administration did not target the 
ongoing production and exports of Russian 
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oil and natural gas. Instead, its punitive 
sanctions focused on the long-term develop-
ment and exploitation of oil reserves in the 
Arctic and of shale oil. These steps were 
taken in close consultation with the Euro-
peans who, in turn, coordinated their uni-
lateral sanctions with Washington. 
From July 2014, the Obama administra-
tion issued new measures, known as sec-
toral sanctions, which were specifically 
designed to raise the costs of long-term 
development of the Russian energy sector. 
Pursuant to E.O. 13,662, the OFAC then 
began to place Russian companies in the 
finance, defence and energy sectors on the 
Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) list. 
Once the list had been published, new 
financing provided from US persons to 
those listed on it were restricted as follows: 
the current maturity of new debt or equity 
may not exceed 14 days for listed Russian 
financial institution (Directive 1), no more 
than 60 days for Russian energy companies 
(Directive 2) and no more than 30 days for 
Russian defence firms (Directive 3). Further-
more, US persons are prohibited from par-
ticipating in the exploration and produc-
tion of oil in Arctic, deep-sea and shale for-
mations (Directive 4). Unlike persons listed 
as SDN, those placed on the SSI list are free 
to dispose of their assets under US jurisdic-
tion and US persons may also continue to 
enter into any other transaction with them. 
Targeting European-Russian 
energy trade 
In August 2017, a bipartisan majority in 
Congress broadened existing sanctions 
against Russia in response to the Russian 
government’s intervention in the Syrian 
civil war from September 2015, to Kremlin-
controlled cyberattacks against US author-
ities and companies, and to evidence of 
Moscow’s interference in the 2016 US pre-
sidential campaign. The Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 
(CAATSA), which was also directed at Iran 
and North Korea, was passed against the 
explicit will of President Trump. The 
CAATSA curtailed presidential authority to 
ease primary sanctions imposed under the 
four executive orders. Furthermore, the 
statute required the administration to 
tighten both primary and secondary sanc-
tions. The latter are not directed against US 
persons, but make certain activities by non-
US persons ‘sanctionable’. In doing so, 
Congress created the legal prerequisites for 
being able to impose even more stringent 
unilateral sanctions as a potentially power-
ful tool within a US Russia policy aimed at 
economic containment. If secondary sanc-
tions were to be imposed, they would spe-
cifically target Russian energy exports. 
The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 
(UFSA), amended by section 225 of the 
CAATSA, authorises the President to ex-
clude those foreign persons from the vital 
US financial market who make “significant” 
investments in certain oil projects or finan-
cial institutions participating in “significant” 
transactions for those projects or for Rus-
sian SDNs. The UFSA now also mandates 
the adoption of primary sanctions against 
Gazprom by prohibiting any medium to 
long-term investment by US persons. How-
ever, these measures will not enter into 
force until the US administration determines 
that the company has been shown to have 
withheld significant quantities of natural 
gas supplies from Ukraine, Georgia, Mol-
dova or NATO allies for political reasons. 
Section 232 of the CAATSA is potentially 
the most serious for European energy sup-
ply. This is because it enables the President 
to impose secondary sanctions on non-US 
persons involved in the construction, mod-
ernization or repair of energy export pipe-
lines if a single investment exceeds one 
million US dollars or if more than five mil-
lion US dollars are invested within twelve 
months – a magnitude quickly achieved 
with capital investment in the energy sec-
tor. The list of pipelines potentially affected 
by this type of sanction not only includes 
the existing Nord Stream pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea, but also Blue Stream and 
Turkish Stream, both of which pass through 
the Black Sea to Turkey, as well as the polit-
ically controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipe-
line. In addition, the provisions contained 
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in section 232 may also apply to pipelines 
passing through Belarus and Poland, or, 
paradoxically, even through Ukraine. The 
sanctions could also target LNG export ter-
minal supplies to Europe and Asia. 
Although the US State Department made 
it clear in late October 2017 that pipeline 
projects initiated before 2 August 2017, 
including any investments made so far, 
would not be affected by possible secondary 
sanctions under section 235, the US admin-
istration is free to amend the guidance at 
any time. 
In any case, Nord Stream 2 has drawn 
condemnation from many sides. Since a 
Russian-European consortium decided to 
build the pipeline in the summer of 2015, 
the project has been criticised across party 
lines in the US, the EU and Germany. The 
German government took the view early on 
that this was a commercial project and 
would, therefore, be subject only to German 
law and was not a matter for EU regulation. 
This position has prompted a phalanx of 
opponents in Washington, Brussels and 
Warsaw to exploit legal remedies and polit-
ical pressure to bring down the project. US 
sanctions could become part of the counter-
measures. 
Overall, the adoption of the CAATSA 
testified to the erosion of consensus on 
both sides of the Atlantic as to how to 
respond to Russian aggression. At congres-
sional hearings in late summer 2018, mem-
bers complained about the limited impact 
of the use of US unilateral sanctions im-
posed in close consultation with the EU, 
and criticised what they perceived to be a 
too lax implementation and enforcement 
by the Trump administration. After the 
Democrats have taken over the House of 
Representatives, the existing sanctions 
could soon be further tightened and ex-
tended. Events in the Kerch Strait in late 
November 2018 have provided new argu-
ments for such a course of action. In fact, 
several bills are circulating in Congress, 
some of which provide for listing more 
Russian companies as SDNs. The resound-
ing impact of such a move was evident in 
April 2018 when aluminium prices sky-
rocketed following the listing of Rusal, the 
world’s second-largest aluminium producer. 
If the Defending American Security from Kremlin 
Aggression Act of 2018 were adopted in the 
US Senate, an even greater number of ener-
gy projects could be threatened by US sanc-
tions. 
Economic Impact 
Since the current US sanctions are designed 
to complicate future oil and gas exploration 
and extraction for Russian companies, their 
impact on Russia’s current oil and natural 
gas production and energy exports has so 
far been rather minimal. However, they 
have dissuaded companies from investing 
in expensive projects and developing new 
large deposits, instead encouraging them to 
concentrate on boosting production from 
previously developed fields and re-opening 
small fields. As a result, current production 
and exports of crude oil and natural gas in-
creased despite the sanctions. 
The Yamal project, led by the Russian 
energy group Novatek and costing 27 billion 
US dollars, extracts natural gas, transforms 
it into LNG and then exports it via the Arc-
tic port of Sabetta in the east of the Yamal 
peninsula. Novatek, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation, the Silk Road Fund 
and French company Total are all involved 
in this project. The project was launched at 
the end of 2013 and began exporting in 
2017. It has an annual capacity of 16.5 mil-
lion tonnes of LNG. In January 2018, it even 
supplied the US city of Everett in Massa-
chusetts, demonstrating the competitive-
ness of Russian LNG. Despite the current 
sanctions against participants in the Rus-
sian project, the sale could legally be bro-
kered by a French dealer and shipped on a 
French tanker. 
Among the projects that are directly 
affected by the US sanctions is one in the 
Kara Sea initiated by Russian company 
Rosneft in conjunction with US company 
Exxon, a project in the Barents Sea with 
Italian company ENI and another in the 
Black Sea with Exxon and ENI. In addition, 
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the British-Dutch company Shell withdrew 
from the offshore production of natural gas 
on Sakhalin after the US Department of 
Commerce classified the enterprise as an oil 
production project. Overall, the impact of 
the sanctions on Russia’s energy industry 
was far less significant than the halving of 
the oil price between mid-2014 and the end 
of 2016, which was followed by a sluggish 
recovery in 2017 and 2018. However, the 
impact of the oil price decline on the ener-
gy industry was largely mitigated by the 
devaluation of the ruble, as this reduced 
company losses. 
Yet, it is uncertain whether Russia will 
be able to continue exporting the same vol-
umes of oil and gas in the future. Hydraulic 
fracturing is considered an indispensable 
technology for keeping Russia’s oil produc-
tion at a stable level in the longer term. 
This technology is needed both for current 
brownfields and for the development of 
new non-conventional deposits. US sanc-
tions on hydraulic fracturing and non-con-
ventional production mainly affected joint 
ventures involving Shell and French firm 
Total (Bazhenov Formation in Western 
Siberia), but also Exxon. 
The longer US sanctions persist, the 
faster and greater the decline in Russian oil 
production could be. The respective invest-
ment cycles are at least five to seven years, 
but more likely, depending on the size of 
deposits, 10 to 12 years. This means that 
after 2022–2025 there could well be a 
sharp fall in Russian oil (and natural gas) 
production, which could have a lasting 
impact on already very volatile markets. 
The structural consequences from US 
sanctions also include restricting the global 
activities of Russian corporations and slow-
ing down their internationalisation activi-
ties – as in the case of privately owned 
Lukoil. The state-dominated Russian cor-
porations, on the other hand, benefit from 
direct recourse to public funds and were 
able to further expand their share in Rus-
sian exploration and production. The im-
pact of the sanctions is counterproductive 
to the interests of the EU and the US gov-
ernment. Moreover and even more serious-
ly, the US sanctions are creating a large 
legal grey area with high risks for Western 
companies. These risks have to be included 
into the cost-benefit considerations of com-
panies doing business in and with Russia. 
The main focus here is on measures aimed 
at the financial sector. As energy relations 
between the United States and Russia have 
declined, the extraterritorial reach of US 
sanctions is particularly serious for third 
parties, especially for European companies. 
In fact, US sanctions are putting increasing 
pressure on European energy companies to 
stop engaging in the Russian market, there-
by weakening their market positions. 
The resulting vacuum allows competitors 
from China, India and also from the Middle 
East to expand their activities. The crux of 
the matter is that state-dominated oil and 
gas companies can expand their market 
shares in leaps and bounds, which could 
have an impact on liberal trade and pricing 
mechanisms in the medium term. The uni-
lateral US sanctions against Russia, Iran and 
Venezuela result in state interventions gain-
ing ground. Politicisation and the political 
instrumentalisation of the energy markets 
is increasing. All of this could have far-
reaching consequences for Europe’s energy 
security, which will then depend increas-
ingly on supplies from these state-owned 
companies. 
US LNG Exports to Europe 
The Shale Revolution has made the United 
States a key player in world oil and gas 
markets. Between 2010 and 2017, domestic 
energy companies increased their daily oil 
production by 73 percent, according to data 
from energy company BP. Exports rose by 
157 percent. Nearly 28 percent more natu-
ral gas was produced during the same 
period. In 2017, the United States was the 
world’s largest producer of both crude oil 
and natural gas. Since Congress lifted the 
export ban on crude oil at the end of 2015, 
exports increased from 465,000 barrels a 
day to just under 1.2 million barrels a day 
in 2017, according to the US Energy Infor-
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mation Administration. The International 
Energy Agency forecasts that the US will 
meet 80 percent of global demand growth 
for crude oil over the next decade. 
As oil prices pick up, US oil production 
will continue to rise and, as a by-product, 
more natural gas will be produced. There 
are two terminals in operation in the US, 
Sabine Pass since 2016 and Corpus Christi 
since November 2018. The two plants have 
an export capacity of 35 billion cubic metres 
annually and another 55 billion cubic 
metres of capacity are to be added in 2019. 
This is roughly equivalent to Germany’s 
annual gas consumption. By 2020, export 
capacity could reach around 100 billion 
cubic metres per year. In 2017, more than 
ten percent of US LNG exports went to 
Europe. 
The availability of secure and compete-
tive energy in the US shields it from devel-
opments on the energy markets. As a result, 
the US is now self-sufficient, meaning that 
the US government has achieved a major 
foreign policy goal and gained considerable 
clout in its international relations. 
US-based production is so huge that 
bottlenecks exist in the processing and 
transport of crude oil and natural gas. In 
order to sustain the production boom, US 
companies are looking for foreign markets 
for their liquefied natural gas. Consequent-
ly, not only are US sanctions based on geo-
political considerations to reduce European 
dependence on Russian energy imports, 
they also fuel Washington’s vested econom-
ic interests, such as reducing the US trade 
deficit and creating domestic jobs. For Presi-
dent Trump’s policy of ‘America First’, 
energy dominance is both the means and 
the end. With him in the White House, the 
thought has become entrenched that the 
main aim should be the pursuit of profit 
and pure profit maximisation and that 
balancing the interests of long-time part-
ners and allies in the field of energy and 
(climate) policy is no longer relevant. Ger-
many’s export surplus is a thorn in his side. 
If Berlin had to import more LNG from 
the US, the balance sheet would shift in 
Washington’s favour. This would also 
cement the energy price spread between the 
US and Europe, with negative implications 
for Europe as an industrial location and for 
European competitiveness. It would also 
have considerable effect on energy prices as 
a whole for private households. 
In the trade dispute between the US and 
the EU, LNG imports from the US have be-
come a negotiating item, as the meeting in 
July 2018 between President Trump and the 
President of the European Commission, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, demonstrated. In any 
case and irrespective of the political noise, 
LNG has become an increasingly important 
component of the portfolio management 
and trading business of European import-
ers. LNG is one of those commodities where 
political and business interests coincide. For 
example, in 2013, the German government 
guaranteed a loan for an LNG terminal in 
Goldboro, Canada. In Germany, the con-
struction of LNG terminal(s) is currently 
under discussion with potential sites in 
Stade, Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. 
There are presently no indications that 
US LNG will be able to undercut the short-
term and long-term marginal costs of Rus-
sian pipeline gas in the European market. 
US LNG is still too expensive to be really 
competitive. The European gas market is 
currently the market that absorbs quanti-
ties not purchased elsewhere because other 
customers are more attractive since they 
pay higher prices. The price differences 
between the Far East and Europe are still 
significant. LNG in Asia is priced at 9.8 US 
dollars per MmBtu (million British Thermal 
Units, average for 2018) and at only 7.7 US 
dollars per MmBtu on the British exchange. 
In addition, major buyers are all located in 
the northern hemisphere and, therefore, 
consumption follows the same seasonal 
curve. European LNG terminals can handle 
a capacity of 150 billion cubic metres per 
annum, but are currently operating at less 
than a quarter of their capacity. However, 
if Russian supplies are to be replaced on a 
large scale, the terminals could reach their 
limits.  
European gas consumers have benefited 
from competition in the gas markets result-
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ing from the shale gas boom in the US and 
the surplus of LNG on the markets. Prices 
fell, even though long-term contracts with 
minimum purchase obligations (take-or-
pay) with European companies will secure 
Gazprom’s sales in the medium term. Gaz-
prom’s market share in the EU of around 
35 percent is the result of long-term con-
tracts and price signals. 
But pressure is likely to continue to rise 
on Europe to import more US LNG. For 
example, a cross-party majority in Congress 
is pushing to prevent the construction and 
operation of Russian gas pipelines. In ad-
dition, in the current trade dispute with 
Washington, the Chinese government 
recently imposed a ten percent tariff on US 
imports of LNG. 
The increasing focus of US sanctions 
policy on Russian natural gas supplies is 
remarkable. Since oil exports contribute far 
more to the Russian budget, limiting the 
budgetary scope of the Russian government 
in this area would be far more effective. 
Nevertheless, in December 2018, the Trump 
administration insisted that production 
levels not be significantly reduced in the 
run-up to the OPEC+ meeting. In doing so, 
the Trump administration had in mind its 
own electorate and its re-imposed sanctions 
against Iran. If it were to target Russian gas 
exports and their market share in the EU 
instead, it would not only receive applause 
from Poland, but it would also give US com-
panies an advantage in the face of intense 
competition for market share. What would 
be detrimental to European import options 
from a market point of view would be ad-
vantageous to the Trump administration. 
Conclusions 
The geopolitical dispute between the US 
and the Russian Federation threatens the 
stability of European and German energy 
supplies. If the US government were to 
target Russian gas exports in the future, this 
would seriously impact Europe’s industrial 
base and its competitiveness. Considering 
the rapidly declining production of natural 
gas in the EU itself, the need for imports is 
already higher than was forecasted just a 
few years ago. Demand for gas has recov-
ered in Europe since 2017, and e.g. the 
phase-out of coal in Germany will have an 
effect here as well. Thus, it is safe to assume 
from a market perspective that Russian 
natural gas will cover the EU’s ‘base load’ 
well into the 2020s. After Gazprom sup-
plied a record 194 billion cubic metres to 
Europe in 2017, exports are likely to have 
increased in 2018. There are three econom-
ic reasons for this: not only does Russian 
natural gas come from the largest reservoir 
in terms of volume, it is also currently the 
most cost-effective. The fields in Western 
Siberia and on the Yamal Peninsula have 
excess supplies of between 130 and 150 bil-
lion cubic metres per year. Moreover, Gaz-
prom has the necessary and diversified ex-
port infrastructure which allows the com-
pany to react flexibly to competitors. But 
Russia is also increasingly orienting itself 
towards Asia. This will further change the 
setting and the dynamics of the gas mar-
kets, also making diversification an impera-
tive for the EU. 
Nevertheless, pressure will continue to 
come from Washington, especially with 
regard to Nord Stream 2. If this project were 
hit with secondary sanctions from the US, 
the EU would have to rely more on a func-
tioning Ukrainian transit corridor and buy 
LNG. Russia’s export pipelines were run-
ning at almost full capacity during the 
period of cold weather in February and 
March 2018. A strong signal that sufficient 
import capacity will be needed in future. 
In any case, US secondary sanctions 
would severely curtail Europe’s ability to 
act autonomously. It should, therefore, be 
possible to build a consensus in the EU. No 
matter where Brussels or the Member States 
stand on Nord Stream 2, the decision about 
what to do should be a sovereign one for 
Europeans. The impact on EU-based com-
panies described above, or on specialist 
European companies laying pipelines for 
offshore and subsea construction, is serious. 
Not only are private economic interests 
affected by unilateral US sanctions, but also 
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skills and technical know-how that are stra-
tegically important for Europe. 
In order to guarantee not only their ener-
gy supply in the long term but also their 
strategic autonomy in this important policy 
area, Europeans need to find a common 
response to Washington and Moscow. As a 
first step in this direction, the European 
Council should swiftly add all the relevant 
US legal bases to the annex of the EU “block-
ing legislation”. As a precautionary mea-
sure, the Instrument in Support of Trade 
Exchanges (INSTEX) to facilitate payments 
outside the dollar area should, in addition 
to Iran, also include business with Russia. 
Finally, the EU and Germany should con-
tinue to focus on diversification, including 
higher LNG imports, not least as a political 
signal to Washington and Moscow. 
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